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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MAXFIELD C. WHITEHEAD, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
ANNA SHAW WHTTEHEAD, 
Defenoont-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10064 
STATEMENT OF :THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for divorce. Defendan!t ·coun-
terclaimed seeking a divorce and alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judg-
ment for the Defendant Plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the lower court judg-
ment awarding to the Defendant the sum of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) as full settlement 
of all property rights and alimony, and a judgment 
in his favor awarding no property rights or ali-
mony to the Defendant. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on De-
cember 27, 1957, the second marri~age for each of 
them. Defendant was 3'2 years of age a!t time of 
marriage and 36 years at time of divorce. (R-86) 
Plaintiff was 4'3 at time of divorce. (R-9'6) Plain-
tfff had children he was supporting by a former 
m'arriage. (R-3'7) Defendant had no children by 
either marriage. 
The Plaintiff prior to the marri'age, was an 
independent contractor and had accumulated several 
parcels of real property, including various homes 
and home conltracts and vacant property. In addi-
tion thereto the Plaintiff had various stocks and 
stock interests in _corporations with which he was 
involved both at the time of marriage and for a 
period of time thereafter. All of Plaintiff's asse1ts 
were either those brought in to the marriage, or were 
accumulated by the sale or transfer o'f assets accu-
mulated prior to the marriage. (R-14, 15, 16, 17) 
Prior to 1the marriage and during the marriage, 
the Defendant was employed by the Salt Lake City 
Board of Education as a school teacher and the 
wages earned by her during the years of marriage 
increased $'1800.00 by reason df her added experi-
ence 'and time in profession as ~a teacher. (R-91) 
The Defen1dant's assets at the time oi marriage were 
a 1'95'3 Mercury automobile and various personal 
effects. During the m~arriage the 1953 Mercury was 
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sold and Defendant given the use of Plaintiff's 1955 
Mercury, which car the Plaintiff offered to give to 
Defendant; All of Defendant's household effects and 
personal i terns were returned to her and are now 
in her possession. ( R-25, 26) 
AU of the property owned by each of the par-
ties was accumulated prior to the marriage of 'the 
parties with the exception of some furniture i terns 
and an accumulated equity in the home occupied by 
the parties during the marriage, which home was 
owned by the Plaintiff prior to the marriage. Dur-
ing the marriage 'there was accumulate'd approxi-
mately an equity of $1500.00 in this home, (R-27, 
28) however, Plain tiff made all of the mortgage 
payments upon said home. 
During 1958 and 1959 Plaintiff ·continued in 
the construction field and in addition t~aded and 
sold several properties acquired pri·or to this marri-
age. During 1960 the Plaintiff was unable to con-
tinue in the contracting business and as a result 
he became employed 'by the Utah Power and Light 
Company earning approxi'mately the sum of 
$3,600.00 per year. Plaintiff has attempted to main-
tain the contracts and real property accumulated 
by him prior to the marriage and to satisfy the 
obligations tha:t were incurred by h'im prior to and 
during the marriage for said properly con tracts, 
(R-19, 20, 21) and other living expenses. (R-24, 
25) Further that Plaintiff has been and is obligated 
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As to the Defendant, here earnings increased 
yearly and she earned, at the time of thi!s action, in 
excess of $5,000.00 per year. Further that she left 
the marriage with no obligations, and her financial 
condi'tion was better than it was when she entered 
the marriage, by reason of accumulated savings 
(R-80). Defendant admitted that she gave up noth-
ing but an unmarried status by her marriage to the 
Plaintiff. (R-95) 
At the time of the m~arriage the parties agreed 
to maintain separate bank ~accounts and to main-
tain the'ir own funds and incomes ( R-22, 79). Plain-
tiff was to maintain house payments and mainten-
ance, and pay for automobile, upkeep and operation. 
Defendant was to pay home utilities and purchase 
of groceries. ( R-23) 
The parties maintained their separate lives 'dur-
ing the marriage, taking separa:te trips, maintain-
ing separate professional and social interests, and 
apparently living in two sepaDate worlds. The fact 
that they were unable to live happily together was 
indicated by the testimony of bdth partie·s that the 
marriage was a business like arrangement from its 
beginning, :and by the fact that divorce was con-
templated by the parties in 1969. (R-83) As a re-
sult the parties separated and this action was com-
menced. 
At time of trial it was agreed the Defendant 
could establish grounds and be awarded the divorce 
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without opposition from Plaintiff but without pre-
judice to the property rights of the Plaintiff. 
Based upon the facts and evidence the trial 
court determined that the Defendant was entitled 
to the sum of Ten Thousan1d Dollars ($10,000.00) 
as aJim'ony 'and property settlement, and entered its 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree. Plaintiff moved for a new trial which 
motion was denied, Plain tiff aJppeals. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE'D IN ENTERING I'TS 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AN'D IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NE'W 'TRIAL. 
At the triai of this case, Plaintiff introduced 
his financial statement of December 31, 1'95'7 ~and 
of December 31, 1961 for the purpose of showing 
that his financial condition has been considerably 
reduced during the four years of marriage. De-
fendant attempted to show that Plaintiff wa:s mis-
representing his asse'ts to the court by rea'son of 
the fact that he failed to list 28,000 shares of King 
Oil Stock on his 1961 statement. Defendant further 
argued that this failure indicated an attempt by 
the Plain tiff to mislead and con'fuse the court. When 
the trial court entered its Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law it became apparent 
tha:t the court was confused, however the confusion 
resulted from the Defendant's illogical arguments 
and not from t:he facts. · 
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Plain tiff testified that most of the King Oil 
Stock was purchased in the early part of 1962, the 
time when the parties separated and th'is action 
was commenced. ( R-1'2) He further testified that 
the 'purchase of this stock was made from fun'ds 
received from the sale of assets 'previously accumu-
lated. It was thereafter determined ~and presented 
to Defendant that Plaintiff owned 30,000 shares of 
stock in King Oil Con1pany, 28,000 shares having 
been purchased after the preparation of iPJaintiff's 
financial statement of December 31, 1'962, and hav-
ing been purchased by the sale of propertie's set 
forth in that 'financial statement. 
The trial court therefore erred in fact in enter-
ing its Supp'lemental Findings of Fact, and erred 
in not granting Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING TO 
THE DEFE'ND.A!NT AS ALIMONY AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT THE SUM OF $'10,000.00. 
At the beginning of the trial in this action, 
the parties !agreed that for the purpose of the di-
vorce Defendant shoul1d establish the grounds with-
out prejudice as to property rights. (R-1, 2) By 
reason of this the element of faun should not be con-
sidered in determining distribution, if any. This, 
together with the fact that the parties were married 
only 4 years, and were without children, places the 
elements to be considered well within the general 
formula se't forth by this court in the case of Pinion 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t•s. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 65 P2d 265. See also Mac 
DO'Ylald vs. Mac Donald, Utah 1951, 236 P2d 1066. 
By its ruling in the Pinion case, the court 'Set 
out the foHowing elements to be considered in deter-
mining the necessity of property settlement, which 
elements Appellant daims should have been con-
sidered 'by the trial court : 
( 1) The amount and kind of property owned 
by each of the parties; 
(2) Whether the property was accumulated 
before coverture or accumulated join'tly; 
(3) 'The ability and opportunity of each to 
earn money; 
( 4) The financial condition and necessities of 
each party; 
( 5) The health of the parties; 
( 6) The standard of living of the parties; 
( 7) Duration of marriage ; 
(8) What, if anything, did parties give up 
by marriage ; 
(9) Age a:t which parties were married. 
Reviewing the facts and testimony presen'ted 
herein it would appear that this case falls directly 
in line with the ruling in the case of Pinion vs. Pinion 
(supra) which case has been referred to by the 
Supreme Court on many occasions. The facts of 
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the two cases ·are similar in that the marriage was 
of relatively short duration; the parties terminated 
the marriage under similar circumstances; the main 
difference !being the fact that in the present case 
the Defendant was employed and had her inde-
pendent income prior to, during and after the mar-
riage. The Supreme Court in the Pinion case stated 
as follows: 
"That the fact that she (the 'Defendant, 
wife and counterclaimant) was married four 
years should ordinarily en ti tie her to a sub-
stantial share of his property if the interrup-
tion of her former career by marriage left 
her rna terially worse off in opportuni1ty as 
compared to where she might have been had 
it not been for the interrupti'on, or the oppor-
tunity or ability for readjustment had materi-
ally suffered. Otherwise, four years out of 
one's life well supported with a return to 
singleness cannot necessarily be counted as 
a detriment. Of course, the ultimate of her 
happiness or unhappiness during the inter-
ruption is purposely omitted in summarizing 
this case.'' 
The Court further stated as follows: 
"As a general rule, a young couple mar-
ried a short time, who break up with no child-
ren, would call it a misadventure in matri-
mony and unles'S the wi'fe has suffered mm:e 
than the ordinary wear and tear of matri-
mony or stands by the divorce to lose sub-
stantial material benefits in economic status 
or loss of inheritance, no alimony ordinarily 
will be given." 
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From the facts of the present case, it would 
appear that all of the property, presently owned by 
the Plaintiff was accumulated prior to his adven-
ture into this marriage, either directly or by sub-
sequent sale or trade. It would further appear 'that 
the ability and opportunity to each of them for earn-
ing money has changed only to the advantage of 
the Defendant in that she is earning more now than 
she had been earning at the time or prior to the 
marriage, while Plaintiff is now employed at a sal-
ary of $3,600.00 per year. Further, that the Defen-
dant has at no time ceased to earn her money in 
the same manner as she had prior to the marriage 
and in fact has not in any way altered or ~hanged 
her way of life. It would further seem that the fin-
ancia;l condition and the necessities of the Defendant 
remained approximately the same, while the Plain-
tiff was, and is required to support minor children 
by his previous marriage, and pay an'd discharge 
the obligation of the real property contracted for 
which contracts are presently delinquent and in 
jeopardy of loss, together with other expenses exist-
ing. The Defendant is only required to support and 
maintain herself and is earning more money with 
which to perform this task than she was prior to 
or during the marriage. The Court should also con-
sider that the Defendant gave up nothing by the 
marriage and that the economic status was not al-
tered by it. The evidence seems to point to the fact 
that she is now 'better off economically than she was 
prior to her marriage. 
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The individual federal income tax returns of 
the parties for the years 1'9'57, 19'58, 195'9, 1960 and 
19161 indicated that the Plaintiff had numerous busi-
ness 'losses and business de1ductions or depreciation 
and other deductions, all of which showed as re-
duced earnings by the Plaintiff. 'The Defendant 
placed great stress on the fact that she was earning 
in excess of $4,000.00 for each of the years involved, 
and that the Plaintiff's income was rar below th1s 
figure. She further attempted to show that for this 
reason the Court should presume that she was in 
fact supporting the Plaintiff during those years. 
However, a review of these matters shows that the 
gross income of Plaintiff was considerably more 
than the net income ultimately shown by this tax 
return, and that much of the reduced income was 
due to the carry-over losses from previous years 
and to aepreciation and other non paid expenses that 
were permitted for tax purposes. 'The true picture 
indicates that the true spendable income of 'Plain-
tiff was considerably more than indicated by the 
tax returns, and was in fact equal to and in excess 
of income of the 1Defenldant. 
!The Defendant had her own money and her 
own bank account and used those funds exclusively 
for her own use. The Plaintiff does not deny that 
the Defendant purchased groceries for the home or 
paid certain home bills, but equally did the Plaintiff 
partic'i pate in the main ten a nee of the home and 
the payment of bills, including the furnishings of 
10 
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gas and oil for the benefit of the Defendant's use 
and pleasure. 
The Defendant should not be permitted to par-
ticipate in the assets that the Plaintiff brought into 
the marriage nor should she now complain because 
the Plaintiff was able to furnish certain tax deduc-
tions during the marriage which permitted the par-
ties to obtain larger tax refunds than could have 
been obtained had the Defendant filed 'her income 
tax separately. 
During the marriage the parties each enjoyed 
good health with no medical prdblem's encountered, 
and this condition continued during the approximate 
7 months that the action was pending in the lower 
court. 
From the evidence presented to the court, it is 
apparent that the parties herein leave this marriage 
in substantially the same ·condition they were at the 
time of the marriage, except for one fact and that 
fact being that the Plaintiff is earning less money 
than he was making at the time of the marriage 
from the gross earnings standpoint, and that the 
Defendant is in fact earning substantially more 
than she was earning at the time of the marriage. 
The Defendant has not materially altered her posi-
tion nor has she suffered any material detriment or 
change in her life as a result of the marriage, and 
that therefore she should not he permitted to ·par-
ticipate or demand from the Plaintiff alimony. 
From all of the facts it is apparent that the 
11 
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Defendant_ has not lost any material benefits in 
economic status, loss of income, loss of inheritance, 
a loss of any possible income by reason of the mar-
riage. It is also apparent that Plaintiff has suffered 
financial losses and is thus in a worse financial con-
dition than he was when he embarked upon this 
sea of matrimony. 
The Court should also consider what, if any, re-
a!djustment is required as a re'sult of the marriage 
and divorce. The facts plainly show that the parties 
basicaHy did not change their pattern or standard 
of living by the marriage nor was any readjustment 
required by the divorce, in fact, the parties con-
tinued in exactly the same educational, social and 
economic circles they enjoyed prior to marriage. The 
Defendant continued to take her own trips, she con-
tinued her professional advancement and enjoyed 
her same friends and associates. 
The Plaintiff contends that the amount of the 
award of alimony and manner of making property 
settlement, if any, should be made only after com-
plete consideration by the court of the condition, 
situation, and standing of the parties, financially 
and otherwise amount and value of estate of the 
husband and the source from which it came and 
how far the wife contributed thereto. See McKee 
vs. McKee, 96 N W 489, Zimmerman vs. Zimmer-
man, 80 N W 643, Wandell vs. Wandell, (Mont.) 
248 P. 864, Openshaw vs. Openshaw, 80 Ut. 9, 12 P2 
364, Hampton vs. Hampton (N.M.) 4'7 P2 419. 
12 
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Appellant recognizes that no general rule can 
be laid down as to how and when alimony should 
be pai(i and property divided, and that each case 
must be determined by its own facts. However, 
where the trial courts determination appears to be 
inequitable and unjust, as the facts herein indicate, 
then this court should enter such decree as it finds 
to be just and equitable, considering as stated in 
the Hampton case (supra) : 
"The amount of the award of alimony is 
to be determined, not by the portion of the 
husband's estate, but by the equities of the 
case having due regard to the financial con-
dition and necessities of the parties." 
13 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court that the De-
fendant is entitled to an alimony and property settie-
ment award of $10,000.00 completely disregards 
the elements that should be considered under the 
rul'ing in the Pinion case (supra) and seemingly 
creates a penalty for unsuccessful marriage. It 
would seem that to allow these parties to leave the 
vessel of matrimony in the same social, educational 
and economic condition as when they embarked 
would be the just and equitable method of release. 
Each party should leave as they came being enriched 
only by the experience of an attempt to bridge two 
educationally and socially different worlds by mar-
riage. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER R. ELLETT 
of 
DANSIE, ELLETT & HAMMILL 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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